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Russia Earned EUR 754 Million a Day From Fossil Fuels in October 2026

/ 14 min read / Malik Tanveer Dhool
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WarBrief Live | November 18, 2026 | Energy & Oil

€754m/day

Russia’s fossil fuel export revenue, October 2026 (+14% month on month)

€449m/day

Crude oil export revenue (+19% month on month)

$101.70

Urals crude average price in October, highest since October 2021

60%

Share of seaborne Russian oil moved by sanctioned shadow tankers

Russia earned an average of €754 million a day from fossil fuel exports in October 2026, the highest since December 2022, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). Export volumes barely changed. Prices did the work.

The figures, published by the Helsinki-based think tank on November 12, 2026, land as the European Union adopts its 22nd sanctions package and as the war in the Gulf keeps energy prices high. They describe a sanctions regime that is biting on paper while war-driven prices lift the revenues it was designed to suppress. This article sets out what CREA found, who is buying, how the oil keeps moving, and what it means for readers in the US, the UK and the EU.

Key Takeaways

  • Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues rose 14% month on month to €754 million a day in October 2026, the highest since December 2022, while export volumes were broadly unchanged, according to CREA.
  • Crude oil drove the increase: revenues rose 19% to €449 million a day, with seaborne crude up 23% to a record €352 million a day.
  • China (€10.7 billion) and India (€6.4 billion) both set record monthly totals for Russian fossil fuel purchases; the EU remained the third-largest buyer at €2.2 billion.
  • Sixty per cent of Russia’s seaborne oil moved on already-sanctioned shadow tankers, and Urals crude averaged $101.70 a barrel, more than double the $44.10 price cap.

What did CREA’s October 2026 data actually show?

CREA’s October 2026 monthly analysis of Russian fossil fuel exports and sanctions puts total export revenues at €754 million a day, up 14% on September and the highest monthly level since December 2022. The think tank stresses that export volumes were broadly unchanged: this was a price story, not a volume story.

Crude oil accounted for more than half of the total. Crude revenues rose 19% month on month to €449 million a day, the highest since June 2022, on volumes up just 6%. Seaborne crude was the engine: revenues rose 23% to €352 million a day, the highest monthly level in CREA’s data going back to January 2022. Pipeline crude earnings rose a more modest 6%.

The rest of the barrel was mixed. Seaborne oil product revenues rose 4% to €85 million a day even as volumes fell 8%, still the third-lowest monthly level since the full-scale invasion. LNG revenues rose 3% to €77 million a day, the highest since January 2023. Pipeline gas revenues jumped 23% to €88 million a day on volumes up 5%, earning more than seaborne oil products for the first time since May 2022. Coal revenues fell 3% to €56 million a day.

The windfall is visible in Moscow’s own accounts. Russia’s mineral extraction tax receipts from crude oil reached 979.3 billion rubles in October, up 42% month on month and the highest level since February 2024, driven by higher oil prices amid the war in the Middle East, according to figures from the Russian finance ministry cited by CREA.

Why did Russia’s oil revenue jump in October?

The short answer is the war premium. In the six months since the US-Israeli strikes on Iran began, higher oil and gas prices have added an estimated $35.9 billion (€31 billion) to Russia’s seaborne export revenues, CREA estimates. October was the month the premium peaked: the average price of Russia’s Urals-grade crude rose 13% month on month to $101.70 a barrel, the highest monthly average in data going back to October 2021.

That price is more than double the $44.10-a-barrel price cap the EU and the UK set on February 1, 2026, and then froze at that level under the EU’s 21st sanctions package. The discount on Urals relative to Brent actually narrowed, averaging $23 a barrel (19%) in October against $24 (21%) in September. In other words, Russian crude is not only expensive; it is selling closer to the world price than it was a month earlier.

Volumes through the Strait of Hormuz underline how the Gulf war, not Russian supply decisions, is setting the price. Oil volumes through the strait rose 9% month on month in October and LNG volumes 15%, yet both remained well below the levels recorded before the US and Israeli strikes on Iran. The strait is still constricted, and the market is still paying for the risk.

There is a second, quieter driver. Russia’s domestic fuel picture improved enough to let exports recover: oil product loadings at Russian ports rose 24% month on month in October, with diesel loadings rising fourfold, although loadings still remained 38% below October 2025 levels. Ukrainian drone attacks have kept the Tuapse terminal, Russia’s fourth-largest oil product export port before the full-scale invasion, from loading any oil products at all since August. Crude loadings at the Baltic port of Ust-Luga recovered 17% month on month, and oil product exports from Novorossiysk rose 30%, albeit from a very low base.

Two oil tankers side by side at sea transferring oil - Russia oil revenue October 2026 CREA sanctions
AI-generated illustration

By the numbers: Russia’s October fossil fuel revenues

Every figure below comes from CREA’s October 2026 analysis, which estimates revenues from shipping movements, customs records and reported prices. They are estimates, not official Russian statistics, and CREA’s methodology means small revisions are possible. No figure in this table rests on a single uncorroborated claim.

MetricFigureSource
Total fossil fuel export revenue€754m/day, +14% month on month, highest since December 2022CREA, October 2026
Crude oil export revenue€449m/day, +19% month on month, highest since June 2022CREA, October 2026
Seaborne crude revenue€352m/day, +23% month on month, record since January 2022CREA, October 2026
Seaborne oil products revenue€85m/day, +4% month on month, volumes down 8%CREA, October 2026
LNG revenue€77m/day, +3% month on month, highest since January 2023CREA, October 2026
Pipeline gas revenue€88m/day, +23% month on month, volumes up 5%CREA, October 2026
Coal revenue€56m/day, -3% month on monthCREA, October 2026
Urals crude average price$101.70/barrel, +13% month on month, highest since October 2021CREA, October 2026
Urals discount to Brent$23/barrel (19%), vs $24 (21%) in SeptemberCREA, October 2026
Mineral extraction tax receipts, crude oil979.3 billion rubles, +42% month on month, highest since February 2024Russian finance ministry, via CREA

Caveat: figures are CREA estimates derived from vessel tracking and customs data. Where CREA labels a figure an estimate, this article does the same; no official Russian revenue total is published for cross-checking.

Who is buying Russian oil now?

Russia’s fossil fuel exports remain highly concentrated. China stayed the world’s largest buyer, accounting for 51% of the revenues from the top five importers, at €10.7 billion in October, its highest monthly total in data going back to January 2022. Crude oil made up two-thirds of China’s purchases (€7.1 billion), followed by LNG (€1.2 billion), pipeline gas (€979 million), coal (€778 million) and oil products (€674 million). ESPO-grade crude from the Pacific port of Nakhodka now accounts for 64% of China’s seaborne Russian crude imports.

India was the second-largest buyer, importing €6.4 billion of Russian hydrocarbons in October, also a record monthly total and, as the Indian Express reported, its highest in data going back to January 2022. Crude oil made up 91% of India’s purchases, at €5.8 billion. Imports rose at all three of India’s largest importing refineries: Vadinar up 12% month on month, Jamnagar up 22% and Paradip up 28%.

The EU remained the third-largest buyer, at €2.2 billion, or 11% of the top five importers’ total. Pipeline gas accounted for 55% of the EU’s imports (€1.2 billion) and LNG for 28% (€606 million); the remaining 17% was crude oil delivered through the Druzhba pipeline to Slovakia and Hungary. Hungary was the EU’s largest buyer at €594 million, followed by Slovakia and France, which imported €424 million of Russian LNG. South Korea was fifth at €488 million, more than half of it LNG.

The pattern is the paradox of the sanctions regime in one paragraph: the two largest buyers are outside the sanctioning coalition, while the EU, which bans Russian seaborne crude outright, still buys Russian gas through pipelines and LNG terminals under transitional contracts.

Oil refinery and LNG terminal at night with oil barrels - Russia oil revenue October 2026 CREA sanctions
AI-generated illustration

How is the shadow fleet keeping the oil moving?

The tankers are the sanctions story’s other half. In October 2026, 60% of Russia’s seaborne oil was transported by sanctioned shadow tankers, with a further 37% carried by G7+-owned or insured vessels. For crude oil specifically, the shadow fleet’s share was higher still: 69% of crude moved on sanctioned shadow tankers, against 29% on G7+ tankers. Oil products are the mirror image, with G7+ tankers carrying 68% and sanctioned shadow tankers 27%.

The fleet is also changing flags. Sixty-two tankers sailing under the Russian flag delivered 47% of the oil carried by the shadow fleet in October, up from 20 tankers and 6% a year earlier, making the Russian flag the largest in the shadow fleet. At the end of October, 393 tankers that had carried Russian oil were sailing under the Russian flag, 183 of them having joined the Russian registry after January 2025. Falsely flagged vessels, by contrast, are shrinking: 40 shadow vessels operated under false flags at the end of October, down from 112 a year earlier, and carried only 3% of the shadow fleet’s oil.

The risks are not only legal. Of the 294 cargoes of Russian crude oil and oil products delivered in October, 159 were carried by shadow tankers, and half of those cargoes sailed on vessels at least 20 years old. Older tankers with poor maintenance and doubtful insurance pose a spill risk in European waters; CREA cites estimates that clean-up and compensation from a single spill could cost coastal taxpayers more than €1 billion. An estimated €71 million of Russian oil was transferred across five ship-to-ship transfers in EU waters in October, mostly off Spain. For the full picture of how these vessels operate, see our explainer What Is a Shadow Fleet? and How Do Oil Sanctions Work?

Why is Russian gas still flowing into the EU?

The gas numbers are the least comfortable part of the report for Brussels. Six months after the EU’s ban on short-term contracts for Russian LNG came into force, EU imports of Russian LNG have fallen by just 1.2% year on year. Between April 25 and October 25, 2026, member states imported 6.42 million tonnes across 89 cargoes valued at €4.1 billion, against 6.50 million tonnes across 90 cargoes valued at €3.1 billion in the same period of 2025. Volumes fell by 1.2% and cargo numbers by one, while higher prices pushed the import value up by about a third.

The reason is in the design of the REPowerEU regulation, adopted on January 26, 2026. Short-term LNG contracts were banned from April 25, 2026, but long-term LNG contracts are permitted until January 1, 2027, and long-term pipeline contracts until September 30, 2027. The EU energy regulator ACER found that no authorisation requests were made for short-term contracts between January and early June 2026: every authorised import was linked to long-term contracts. In effect, the first deadline banned a type of contract that was hardly being used, and cargoes were simply redistributed between member states. France remained the largest importer over the six months at 2.65 million tonnes, Spain recorded the largest increase, up 53% to 1.45 million tonnes, and Belgium fell 30%.

The same pattern shows up in refined products. Despite the EU’s ban on oil products made from Russian crude, twelve shipments from refineries processing Russian crude were unloaded at EU ports in October, up from seven in September. Ten departed from India’s Jamnagar refinery and two from Turkiye’s STAR refinery; Italy and Romania unloaded three each. Refineries in India, Turkiye and Brunei that use Russian crude exported €1.6 billion of oil products to sanctioning countries in October, a 21% rise in volume month on month, of which an estimated €389 million was refined from Russian crude. The EU took €1.2 billion of it.

What Russia’s €754 million a day means for US/UK/EU readers

For readers in the US, the UK and the EU, the October figures cut three ways. First, fuel prices: the war premium that fills Moscow’s coffers is the same premium that keeps petrol, diesel and heating costs elevated at home. Brent has eased from its October highs even as tankers burned in the Strait of Hormuz, but the October data shows how quickly a Gulf escalation feeds straight into Russian revenues, which is why the price at the pump and the Kremlin’s war chest now move together. Our explainer on how war affects oil prices sets out the mechanism.

Second, sanctions policy: the figures will shape the debate over the EU’s 22nd package, which the Council adopted on November 16 and which lists 145 targets, including Russian refineries and banks. CREA calculates that a $30-a-barrel price cap, if fully enforced, would have cut Russia’s seaborne oil export revenues by 25%, or €3.4 billion, in October alone. That is the scale of the lever available, and the scale of the enforcement gap. Read our coverage of the 145-target package and what to expect next for the detail.

Third, energy security at home: the EU’s LNG imports from Russia have barely moved despite the REPowerEU ban, and the real test is the long-term contract deadline on January 1, 2027. Until then, Russian gas keeps flowing into European terminals under contracts signed before the war, and the bloc’s dependence is being redistributed between ports rather than removed. For households, that means the winter gas bill still carries a Russian component, and for policymakers, it means the phase-out timetable is doing less than its headlines suggest.

What happens next: the 22nd package and the January LNG deadline

Three dates now matter. The first is the EU’s 22nd sanctions package, adopted November 16, whose 145 listings include the Gazprom Neft Moscow and Omsk refineries and dozens of banks and energy firms. Whether it dents the revenue figures above depends on enforcement against the shadow fleet and the refineries in third countries that process Russian crude, which is where the October report finds the largest leaks.

The second is January 1, 2027, when the EU’s long-term LNG contracts with Russia expire under REPowerEU. CREA’s assessment is blunt: Russian LNG will continue flowing into the EU at nearly unchanged rates until that deadline, which will be the real test of the regulation. Member states are expected to apply authorisation and origin checks rigorously so existing contracts cannot be amended, extended or relabelled.

The third is the price cap itself. CREA recommends that the price cap coalition either fix the cap at a level that severely restricts Russian revenues or replace it with a value-based sanction, such as a tax on the use of Western maritime services to transport Russian fossil fuels. A $30 cap, the think tank calculates, would have removed a quarter of October’s seaborne oil revenues. The coalition has so far kept the cap frozen at $44.10, while Urals trades at $101.70. The gap between those two numbers is the story of October 2026, and it is the number to watch in the next CREA report.

This article is educational and does not constitute financial advice. Figures are CREA estimates unless otherwise stated.

Frequently asked questions

How much did Russia earn from fossil fuels in October 2026?
Russia earned an average of €754 million a day from fossil fuel exports in October 2026, according to CREA, up 14% on September and the highest since December 2022. Crude oil accounted for €449 million a day of that total, with seaborne crude at a record €352 million a day.

Why is Russia earning more from oil despite sanctions?
Prices, not volumes. Export volumes were broadly unchanged in October, but the war premium from the Gulf conflict pushed Urals crude to $101.70 a barrel, more than double the $44.10 price cap. CREA estimates the higher prices since the US-Israeli strikes on Iran began have added $35.9 billion to Russia’s seaborne export revenues over six months.

Who buys the most Russian fossil fuels?
China is the largest buyer at €10.7 billion in October 2026, followed by India at €6.4 billion; both set record monthly totals. The EU was third at €2.2 billion, mostly pipeline gas and LNG, with Hungary the largest EU buyer at €594 million.

What is the oil price cap, and is it working?
The G7 and EU cap the price at which Russian crude can be sold using Western shipping and insurance, currently $44.10 a barrel after it was lowered on February 1, 2026. In October, Urals averaged $101.70, more than double the cap, because most Russian oil now moves on shadow tankers outside Western services. CREA calculates a $30 cap, if fully enforced, would have cut October seaborne oil revenues by 25%.

Will the EU’s 22nd sanctions package cut Russian oil revenue?
The package, adopted November 16, lists 145 targets including Russian refineries and banks, but its effect depends on enforcement against the shadow fleet and third-country refineries processing Russian crude. The October data shows the leaks are large: 60% of seaborne oil moved on sanctioned tankers and 12 shipments of products refined from Russian crude reached EU ports.

Sources

Read next: Why Brent Oil Fell While Tankers Burned in the Strait of Hormuz · How War Affects Oil Prices: Risk Premiums, Chokepoints and Sanctions · Sanctions hub

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